There is little evidence on the comparative effectiveness of different competition policy measures, especially in transition economies. This research represents the effort to expand the financial event study method for the assessment of different competition policy measures: merger control, antitrust investigations on abuse of dominance, and changes of import tariffs in the Russian ferrous and non-ferrous metals markets from 2007 to 2012. According to the reaction of financial market, mergers between Russian metal producers restrict competition and reduce consumer welfare. Antitrust investigations have a positive effect on stock prices of buyers of metal and no significant impact on the market valuation of target of investigation. Changes in import tariffs have a positive significant impact on the company stock prices. The sign of each effect allows the comparison of different measures of competition policy.
Introduction
An effective competition policy is one of the most important factors of successful economic development. Competition is affected by different economic policy tools, including those aimed at the prevention of competition restrictions as well as at competition promotion.
The appropriate design of competition policy tools is an important task for the government and competition authorities.
The assessment of effects of different competition policy tools is based on industrial organization theory (IO). Traditional and the modern IO emphasize the greater importance of entry cost compared to the number of sellers and distribution of market participants between them for competition. This conclusion is confirmed, in particular, by the results research into different dimensions of competition policy [Buccirosi et al., 2014] and the impact of the liberalization of foreign trade on the competition [Melitz, Ottaviano, 2008] . Existing empirical papers assessing the effects of competition policy, especially for transition economies [Duso et al, 2011; Carletti, 2011] , estimate, mainly, separate measures without any comparison. A comparative effect of competition policy measures should differ depending on the industry structure of an economy, the position of national industries in the global division of labor and the institutional environment of competition policy application. That is why studies of comparative effectiveness of policies in certain countries are important.
The method of financial event studies applied in the paper is suitable for an assessment of any notable events which affect company valuations. Financial event studies increasingly aim to evaluate decisions taken by regulators in the assessment of competition policy. If the hypothesis of the effective financial market is true, the market will react to the announcement of, for example, the beginning of an antimonopoly investigation by a change in stock prices.
Changes in competition policy may have effects on investor expectations on welfare redistribution and thus stock prices. The extent to which government or competition agencies can rely on the approach first proposed by Eckbo & Weir [1985] depends on the degree of accuracy it takes into account. If stock market reactions correspond to theoretical predictions and this is confirmed by data from independent sources, it is possible to recognize the stock market ability to predict the effects of competition policy measures.
The basic idea underlying the use of the financial event approach for the assessment of competition policy measures relies on the impact of competition together with other important determinants (first of all the efficiency of the firms) on the profits of market participants. In an imperfectly competitive market the measure enhancing competition among existing sellers 4 ceteris paribus results in a decrease of their profit and increase of a buyer gains. Changes in market structure (including the number of participants in the market and entry cost for potential competitors), which affect competition, induce changes in the expected profits of market participants captured by the valuation of companies in financial markets.
There are several papers estimating the effects of competition policy measures using financial event studies [see for example : Eckbo, Wier, 1985; Prager, 1992; Gunster, Djik, 2010 Duso et al, 2011 . However only few authors analyze the influence of an event on all participants of competition -a target, directly affected company, its competitors, and buyers [Mullin et al; 1995] . Campa and Hernando [2008] assess the reaction of industry insiders, analysts and competitors to the announcement of M&As in the European Union financial industry in the period 1998-2006. They provide evidence that the correlation between abnormal returns for merging firms and competitors is positive and, in some cases, domestic deals are more likely to have a negative impact on industry competition. Including the stock changes of large buyers eliminates possible misinterpretations, as the combination of rival and buyer reactions enhances the reliability of the conclusions. Nevertheless, the inclusion of all these companies increases substantially the accuracy of the method. For example, only such calculations allow objective conclusions about the validity of one of the sub-hypotheses of the Market Power Hypothesis (efficiency or predatory pricing).
In this paper, we contribute to the existing literature by providing a comparison of the effects of different competition policies. We focus on the Russian metal industry which is dominated by large sellers, an export orientation, and a relatively isolated domestic market.
These market features allow for the abuse of dominance, and there is relatively strong antitrust enforcement against abuse of dominance. In order to support proposed approaches we develop and test hypotheses on the impact of M&A announcements, antitrust investigations and changes in tariff policy on stock market values.
The paper is structured as follows: section 2 presents a literature review on comparative analysis of competition policy effects and financial event studies of competition policy. Section 3 analyzes the problems of competition development in the Russian ferrous and non-ferrous metal industries. Section 4 describes the competition policy tools applied by the Russian competition authority in the relevant markets. Section 5 deals with the methodology and the sample. Section 6 discusses the results. Section 7 concludes. Historically, antitrust enforcement has paid attention to the market structure: the number of sellers and the distribution of the market between them. US DOJ Horizontal Merger Guidelines, the guidelines of the European Commission, and other competition authorities distinguish between market shares which would be harmful for competition and those that would not be. In this respect, competition policy follows so called structure-conduct-performance (SCP) paradigm, where number of competitors impacts competition. In spite of the fact that SCP was criticized [Demsetz, 1974] and mostly rejected as an analytical framework -it influences the approach of antitrust authorities worldwide. Moreover, modern IO supports the importance of the number of sellers for competition, for incentives to collude [Selten, 1973 , Compte et al., 2002 . Being able to influence the number of sellers a merger approval changes the conditions for competition. More so when the competition authority imposes structural remedies, asking market participants to sell assets in a given industry as a necessary condition for merger approval.
Entry cost is another feature which affects competition. After Bain [1956] the importance of entry cost to explain competition irrespective of market concentration was articulated by the contestable market approach [Baumol et al., 1982] . Modern economic theory including empirical research also highlights the importance of entry cost as a determinant of market competition [Seade, 1980] . Despite competition policy not affecting a large part of entry cost, at least two components of entry cost are important policy variables: import duties and the cost of compliance with entry requirements set by legislation.
In contrast antitrust enforcement tries to influence competition directly through punishing the restrictions of competition. The main instrument is a system of sanctions. In order to equalize the expected gains from the restriction of competition with the expected monetary equivalent of sanctions, legislators spend resources on detection, technique of investigation, vary the amount and principles of calculating fines. Though the effectiveness of prosecution is questionable [Crandall, Whinston, 2003] , there is evidence that it provides an impact on the behavior of market participants.
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IO provides no specific analytical framework to predict the comparative effectiveness of different competition policy measures. However, it allows the expectation that the removal of or a significant reduction in entry costs could provide a stronger effect on competition compared to the merger decision. In turn, both this decision and changes to entry cost should provide a stronger and more sustainable impact on competition compared to antitrust enforcement in form of sanctions and remedies. We expect that changes in market structure enhance competition more reliably than antitrust law enforcement, because the latter influences the incentives to compete in contrast to the incentives to compete in order not to commit on law violations.
Empirical Assessment of Competition Policy Effects
Empirical analyses of competition policy effects are important in the studies of transition and developing countries. This is reasonable because these countries provide conditions for 'natural experiments': in all countries the set of competition policy instruments was introduced, but the time span of the competition promotion differed. Recent papers found a positive impact of competition and competition policy on productivity indicators [Voigt, 2009] . The same results were recently obtained for developed countries as well [Buccirossi et al., 2013] .
In contrast to competition itself, which is considered as an explanatory variable in many studies, the number of studies which consider the impact of competition policy and especially different competition policy tools is relatively limited. Effectiveness of competition policy measures was analyzed separately, but not in a comparative setting. Crandall and Whinston [2003] provide evidence on the ineffectiveness of US antitrust enforcement; Baker [2003] extensively criticizes their approach and results. For European competition policy Duso et al. For our research there are also some important papers on the impact of international trade and import penetration on competition [Navas and Licandro, 2011] and on the comparative impact of import liberalization and antitrust enforcement on competition in transition countries [Marinov, 2010] .
The dependence of competition effectiveness on the concentration of the market is important for choosing the empirical sample. Domowitz et al. [1986] control for the degree of foreign competition in the takeover industry and provide evidence that price-cost margins are more sensitive in more concentrated industries. The inclusion of measures of import competition also elaborates for finding a sizable positive effect of import competition on the competition intensifying in concentrated industries [Katics, Petersen, 1994] .
The competition policy tools effects in the financial event studies
Financial event studies in antitrust are generally applied to the analysis of M&A influence on the value of participating firms. Mergers motivated by monopoly power are detrimental to consumers and lead to anticompetitive effects as they result in higher prices and lower consumer welfare. M&As which provide a substantial efficiency increase are procompetitive and beneficial to consumers. Empirical results depend on the type of mergers, the valuation method and the industry considered [Singal, 1996] . Some papers concentrate on a single event. Warell [2007] analyzes a merger between Rio Tinto and North in ferrous metal industry, including their close competitor -BHP; others investigate the selection of largest mergers [Healy et al., 1992; Eckbo, Thorburn, 2000; Kuipers et al. 2003 ]. Among papers there are differences in the dataset: some papers concentrate on the analysis of M&As in a particular country or industry [Ismail, Davidson, 2005; Lensink, Maslennikova, 2008; Elfakhani et al. 2003 ] while others try to estimate the differences in the reaction to local deals and cross-border M&As. Gregory and O`Donohoe [2014] find a difference in short term wealth effects between public acquiring and target shareholders on the dataset of UK acquisitions over the period 1990-2005. In general, domestic acquirers under-perform cross-border acquirers; firm characteristics and leverage largely explain acquirer returns.
If merger control is effectively enforced, it should prevent the increase of market power leading to substantial reductions of competition, while it should stimulate M&As producing efficiency gains because this is beneficial to consumers and total welfare [Carletti, et.al. 2011] .
Merger control should limit M&As or create remedies for those generating excessive market power. If investors anticipate this, the introduction of merger control or reforms leads to a decline in company stock values relative to the situation where merger control is absent. Usually 8 this happens for companies most likely to be involved in (large) mergers [Brady, Feinberg, 2000] . The economic impact of merger control on stock prices is investigated in the academic literature. Many papers focus on the effects of the decision of an antitrust authority to investigate a merger proposal in detail or to impose remedies [Ellert, 1976; Aktas, De Bodt and Roll, 2004; Duso, Neven and Röller, 2007] . The results confirm that regulatory actions influence valuation.
There are papers calculate the reaction of stock market not only on M&A announcements, but also on the antitrust investigations. Huth and MacDonald [1989] analyzed the influence of section 2 district and appellate court decisions on the stock prices of companies from 1962-1986. They found that stock prices increased in reaction to a positive judgment, otherwise stocks return fell. Prager [1992] announcement of M&A. Remedies on average do not render a similar effect. In another paper Gunster and Djik, [2011] show that on average the stock prices of the participating companies decrease by 2% at the date of final decision-making on the M&A and increase by 4% with a favourable decision by competition authority. These results show that the stock market expects a decrease in the profitability of the united company with merger control. The scale of this decrease depends on the size of the penalty, duration of a violation of the law, the size of the company and the level of interest to M&A from mass media. This paper contributes to the research stated above, assessing the effects of competition policy. The novelty is the application of event studies for the comparison of the effects of different competition policy tools. The paper is also the first trying to assess the effects of competition policy towards highly concentrated industry of the transition economy such as Russian Federation.
Competition policy issues in the Russian metallurgy industry
Russian metallurgy consists of ferrous and non-ferrous metals covering all stages of technological processes from the mining to finished products. The structure of Russian metallurgy reflects the orientation of production to exploration of the competitiveness of natural resources, which results in a high share of basic production and a relatively low share of high value-added products . The capacity and growth of the domestic metal market in Russia is low.
Providing more than 40% of internal consumption, the largest metal consumers are the mechanical engineering and construction industries. Russian metallurgy mostly focuses on exports, with more than a half of ferrous metals and 80% of non-ferrous metals being exported.
Russian metal producers are deeply integrated into the world market.
Along with an increase in the competitiveness of Russian metal producers in the world markets after the export liberalization in the early 1990 and a wave of mergers, the position of domestic metal buyers is considerably worsening. They suffer from insufficiently developed competition in input markets because of two factors: high concentration and high import protection. After the waves of mergers during 1990-2000 most Russian markets in ferrous and non-ferrous metals are dominated by large companies. In many markets (aluminum, nickel, and electric steel), the share of the largest company in domestic production is close to 100%. During the period several M&As with Russian metal producers were approved by the Federal Antitrust Service (FAS): Rusal-Sual-Glencore (2007) 4 ; LionOre mining-Norilsk Nickel (2007) Before 2008, import duties on the majority of metal products were about 5%. At the beginning of 2008 financial crisis, average import duties increased from 5% to 15% and from 15% to 20%, depending on the position, on the majority of wire and pipes made from ferrous metals. Also there was a 15% preference for domestic producers in government procurements, and antidumping and special protective investigations against foreign suppliers.
World prices increased, which allowed Russian metal producers to achieve competitive advantages and enjoy increased profits, however rising prices had a negative impact on Russian metal buyers of metals. Russian metal suppliers achieve higher market power on the domestic product market than foreign companies do in their own markets. According to international trade theory [Krugman, Obstfeld, 2012] , internal prices will be set at world levels minus expenses connected with export only if the domestic market for goods is characterized by a high level of competition and low entry costs. Otherwise, when domestic producers dominate the market and can carry out price discrimination, the price of goods will be higher in the market with less elastic demand, i.e. in the domestic market. Papers show that prices for Russian exports in the domestic market are higher than when exporting confirm this statement [Golovanova, 2010] .
Although possessing a monopoly in the domestic product market, sellers face high competition in foreign markets. This pushes them to apply a third degree price discrimination -to set domestic prices higher than those in export contracts. Price discrimination is not a rarity in export-oriented industries [Pursell, Snape, 1973] .
This situation attracts the close attention of Russian competition authorities. The problem is that it is difficult to determine whether it is better not to disturb the strengthening of Russian metal producers in the global market by opposing the mergers or to apply tools for supporting The following year, after the acquisition of VIZ-Steel Ltd., the Russian market of electric steel became almost completely monopolized. As a part of merger approval the companies were assigned a set of remedies, according to which they cannot increase the price of electric steel by the largest producer of aluminum with an output that comprises 9% of the world's aluminum production 9 . At the same time, the domestic aluminum price is a subject to specific remedies developed by FAS in order to prevent excessive prices for Russian customers.
Here there are obvious contradictions in pursued policy: FAS allows M&As that may restrict competition, under the remaining import tariff protection introduced by the Government, which also does not strength competition, while initiating proceedings for the violation of the antitrust law, based on signs of buyer sufferings because of insufficiently developed local competition. Practically the choice of the appropriate tool of competition policy towards domestic market is an important and still unresolved issue for the Russian government.
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Russian metal industries are good cases for assessing the influence of different competition policy tools on competition and for comparing their effects.
Tools of competition policy in metallurgy of the Russian Federation
Russian competition authority applies traditional competition policy tools, including merger control, antitrust investigation and enforcement.
The procedure of M&A approval represents an important tool of competition policy. The purpose of this procedure is to provide antitrust control over the changes of market structure.
According to Russian Competition Law if the annual turnover of the combined businesses exceeds RU 10 bn or if assets exceed RU 7 bn, the FAS must be notified of the merger, and they must examine it to see if it would significantly impede competition. If the FAS the finds no distortion effect on competition, the M&A is approved unconditionally. Otherwise they must be prohibited to protect competition or cleared under specific conditions. Generally, less than 1 percent of investigated M&A were not approved 10 . However, not all mergers which significantly impede competition are prohibited. Сonsidering the influence of this tool of competition policy on competition it is possible not to distinguish between M&A announcements which appeared in the media and were approved by the FAS. This is due to the peculiarities of Russian competition policy, i.e. companies rarely make an announcement before receiving informal approval by the FAS. Since this information is usually hidden, the only way for the financial market to obtain this information is during the announcement. Changes in stock prices of companies involved in M&As should reflect the expected redistribution of welfare in the market. For instance, for weakening competition, we expect a profit increase for sellers (both participants and nonparticipants of a merger deal) and a profit decrease for buyers. Otherwise, due to efficiency effects the stock market may reflect a profit increase for both participants and buyers and a profit decrease for competitors. However, these effects may differ depending on the type of M&A. A detailed description of possible stock market reaction is presented in Appendix 1.
Antitrust investigation and enforcement became important for market participants after the reform of fine system, which introduced fines up to 4% company turnover for antitrust law violations. However the effectiveness of antitrust enforcement in Russia remains limited due to the high number of investigations and the high ratio of decisions reversed by courts, which indirectly display the high probability of Type I error (wrongful conviction) [Avdasheva, the maximum fine to be applied is 4% of annual company turnover. There are some differences between fines for collusion and fines for the abuse of dominance, in the latter case the expected fine is lower, however the highest fines in the history of the Russian antitrust law were for the abuse of dominance. Third, FAS often applies remedies towards sellers, which restrict the available set of marketing strategies and limit profit. Finally, an antitrust investigation is supposed to prevent further violations; and since any restriction of competition enhances the profit of a seller in the short or long-run the investigation prevents the violator from receiving this extra profit.
At present, FAS carries out the correction of behavior of large sellers in the domestic market by developing obligatory remedies for all dominant sellers in the markets in the framework of commercial policies [Radchenko et al., 2013] . It confirms that problems in this industry are so severe that FAS is even ready for price regulation. However, the expected efficiency of these measures is ambiguous.
In this situation, it makes sense to think over the use of such competition tools as import liberalization via changes in tariffs and non-tariff barriers. The reduction of quantity and the size of the import duties, whose fiscal or regulatory value is not confirmed, can positively effect the competition in industries in which there is a high concentration of a domestic production leading to a deterioration of competition conditions in the relevant markets. The elimination of import protection in Russian metal industries can have a positive effect on prices in the market by restricting the power of large metal producers and this leads to stock prices increases/decreases of buyers/sellers respectively. These effects may reverse if the investors expect shortages in the market after the reduction of import duties.
We compare the effects of these three measures of competition policy based on the idea that all of them influence company performance, the principles of price setting by sellers and the market value of the companies. In spite of different policy measures addressing different market participants in different ways, all they affect competition and/or the cost of sellers and therefore the long-term benefits of all parties are affected. For example, if an antitrust investigation prevents sellers from abusing dominance in the form of excessive prices, the redistribution of 14 welfare in favor of buyers takes place. However when an antitrust investigation lowers the price of the seller which is abusing the dominant position, it changes the market environment for other sellers and normally results in a decrease in their prices as well. Despite overseas metal producers potentially importing their products in Russia are the target group of import liberalization, import liberalization should also result in price decrease: it limits the ability of domestic sellers to increase prices in the short and long run and increases benefits of buyers.
Since stock prices capture expectations of investors concerning company prospects the sign of statistically significant abnormal return allows a comparative assessment. At the given stage of the research we are unable to compare the magnitude of the effects of different measures, however the ability to compare the sign of effects is also important.
Methodology and data

Event study
To test the hypotheses a standard event study methodology is adopted [see Brown, Warner, 1985] . First, we estimate the market model during the estimation period [-220 days; -30 days] 11 before the announcement date:
,
where is the current return for security i at day t, is the return on an appropriate market index at day t Second, based on estimated coefficients from (1), we calculate abnormal returns for security i at day t:
where ̂ and ̂ are OLS values from the estimation period
Often it is not possible to estimate precisely an event date due to the time of information distribution, so that it is necessary to calculate cumulative abnormal returns: ,
where t1 and t2 are the boundaries for the event period 11 The choice of the event window should satisfies at least two conditions: it should not overlap event window, and it should be long enough. For example (-260; -61) [Kuipers et al., 2003] , (-244;-6) [Brown, Warner, 1985] ; (-220;-30) [Günster, Dijk, 2010] ; (-200; -10) [Padmavathy, Ashok,2013 ].
Then we run a t-test to calculate whether CARs are significantly different from zero. The null hypothesis is that the cumulative abnormal return is equal to zero:
T-statistics are given by:
where CAAR is the cumulative average abnormal return, s is cross-sectional variance of the abnormal returns in period t:
However, the assumption that all abnormal returns are equally distributed is too rigid as some stocks are more volatile than others. The inclusion of such stocks into the dataset can lead to a high dispersion of AR i and, as a result, to decrease the power of tests. In this regard, we use a standardization procedure [Brown, Warner, 1985] . For this purpose, the standardized abnormal return (SAR it ) is calculated by the division of abnormal return to its standard deviation (s i ) calculated on an analyzed interval (t1, t2):
, where
T-statistics is given by:
Event study method is based on the idea that changes in stock valuation will properly capture expected changes in the profitability of the firm and the subsequent redistribution of welfare in the market. The main problem is that identical changes in the expected profit of sellers may reflect different changes in market structure and competition: to identify the relevant effect assessment of respective changes of the expected profits of rivals and customers for the specific type of event. For instance, an increase of profit and the valuation of the merging company under a horizontal merger can reflect a weakening of competition (the market power hypothesis) but also an efficiency improvement (the efficiency hypothesis). To delineate between them it is 
Data
The dataset includes all 17 companies in metal industry listed MICEX-RTS stock 
Results and discussions
Tab. 1 presents the t-statistics for a subset of 10 horizontal M&As and 3 vertical deals.
The analysis reveals that horizontal M&As lead to a negative abnormal return for domestic buyers equivalent to 3.12 standard deviations during the period surrounding the announcement date [-5 days, +5 days] . Not all policy measures provide statistically significant impact on market participants' valuation. Moreover, in some cases results are opposite to expected ones. Notes: *, **, *** -the level of significance 10, 5, and 1% respectively. Notes: *, **, *** -the level of significance 10, 5, and 1% respectively.
The analysis of antitrust investigations reveals only one statistically significant dependence for metal buyers (see Table 2 ). Stock prices of buyers noticeably increase (at a rate of 2.05 standard deviations) which could be caused by the expectations of improved competition conditions after investigations in the industry, but when we extend the period analyzed this effect becomes insignificant. Stock prices of participants of investigation decrease showing that the stock market expects a deterioration of their welfare. However, this dependence is not statistically significant.
As elimination of import protection in the Russian metal industry can have a positive effect on competition by restricting the market power of large metal producers, we expect that a decrease in import tariffs leads to stock price decreases for metal producers, and an increase in the stock prices of metal buyers. The analysis concludes that changes in tariff policy have a positive effect on the stock prices of producers and no significant impact on the stock prices of buyers in Russian metal industry (see Table 3 ). The results contradict intuition, because the stock market positively assess the competition strengthening for producers.
Tab. 3. Tariff policy effects: t-statistics for CAR (10 events)
Announcement day [-5 days before, +5 days after] Producers of metal 2.17** 1.92* Buyers of metal 0.11 0.14 Notes: *, **, *** -the level of significance 10, 5, and 1% respectively. However even these results allow us to draw several interesting conclusions. First, financial event studies can be applied not only to assess distinct policy measures but also to compare different measures, at least on the qualitative level. Second, among different competition policy measures financial markets consider mergers to be the most influential.
Conclusions
Among the competition policy measures examined, the effects of merger approval are assessed as the strongest. According to the reaction of financial markets, horizontal mergers are detrimental for consumers, in contrast to the negligible effects of import liberalization. This is in spite of the impact of decreasing entry costs which should provide a stronger and more sustainable impact on the market than mergers. The possible interpretation is that stock markets consider the likelihood of entry as low irrespective of the level of import protection. In this case, large horizontal mergers under imperfect competition can substantially harm consumers and other tools of competition policy cannot compensate because of the market structure.
Investigations on the abuse of dominance in contrast to what should be expected provide no effects on the target company and competitors, but positive effects on consumers. A possible interpretation is the expectation that the removal of abusive practices should benefit consumers without negatively impacting the dominant company. Concerning tariff policy the analysis suggests that changes in the rates of import duties on metal products in Russia have a significant positive impact on the price of incumbent stocks. Again, a probable explanation is that the 20 removal or decrease of import duty is considered as evidence that potential entry does not create a credible threat for the dominance of the incumbent which confirms the strong competitive advantages of the latter. Alternatively, it may be that the metal producers and their stockholders expected the outcome to be even worse -say, for tariffs to be cut to 2%, while in reality they were only cut to 4% -and so this was actually a good surprise rather than a bad surprise
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